Collective Bargaining and Staff Salaries in American Colleges and Universities by Klaff, Daniel B & Ehrenberg, Ronald G
Cornell University ILR School
DigitalCommons@ILR
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection
10-2003
Collective Bargaining and Staff Salaries in
American Colleges and Universities
Daniel B. Klaff
Cornell University
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Cornell University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, Education Economics Commons, Higher Education
Commons, and the Labor Economics Commons
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Collective Bargaining and Staff Salaries in American Colleges and
Universities
Abstract
Previous studies of union wage effects in higher education have examined faculty salaries, but not staff salaries.
This study, using data from a 1997-98 survey conducted by the Association of Higher Education Facilities
Officers and other sources, investigates how union coverage affected staff salaries at 163 U.S. colleges and
universities. The authors estimate a union salary premium of 9-11%, with variation from near zero for some of
the 47 occupations in their sample to 13-16% for others, such as the skilled building trades. The union/
nonunion differential appears to be larger in 2-year than in 4-year institutions, but does not vary between the
public and private sectors. Where faculty members are covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
unionized staff members appear to enjoy an additional salary gain of 2-3%.
Keywords
higher education, staff salaries, union wage effects, collective bargaining
Disciplines
Collective Bargaining | Education Economics | Higher Education | Labor Economics | Labor Relations
Comments
Suggested Citation
Klaff, D. B. & Ehrenberg, R. G. (2003). Collective bargaining and staff salaries in American colleges and
universities [Electronic version]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57(1), 92-104.
Required Publisher Statement
© Cornell University. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/618
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND STAFF SALARIES 
IN AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
DANIEL B. KLAFF and RONALD G. EHRENBERG* 
Previous studies of union wage effects in higher education have examined 
faculty salaries, but not staff salaries. This study, using data from a 1997-98 
survey conducted by the Association of Higher Education Facilities Officers and 
other sources, investigates how union coverage affected staff salaries at 163 U.S. 
colleges and universities. The authors estimate a union salary premium of 9-
11%, with variation from near zero for some of the 47 occupations in their 
sample to 13-16% for others, such as the skilled building trades. The union/ 
nonunion differential appears to be larger in 2-year than in 4-year institutions, 
but does not vary between the public and private sectors. Where faculty 
members are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, unionized staff 
members appear to enjoy an additional salary gain of 2-3%. 
I n 2001, a twenty-day sit-in at Harvard University brought the living-wage de-
bate to the forefront of American conscious-
ness. After a six-month study, the Harvard 
Committee on Employment and Contract-
ing Policies, a 19-member committee of 
faculty, staff, administrators, and students 
that had been appointed by Harvard’s presi-
dent as a result of the discussions to end the 
sit-in, recommended giving raises to the 
university’s lowest-paid employees and re-
lying more on collective bargaining in the 
future to assure that the wages paid by 
subcontractors did not undercut local union 
wage scales (Chronicle of Higher Education, 
January 11 , 2002). A three-day sit-in at the 
University of Connecticut that related to 
the living wage issue also yielded a substan-
tive victory for campus workers. The pro-
testers there generated an almost two-dol-
lar increase in wages, as well as substantial 
improvement in benefits for many of the 
university’s workers (Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation, May 25, 2001). Collectively, such 
*Daniel Klaff is an undergraduate at Cornell’s 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations and a re-
search assistant at the Cornell Higher Education Re-
search Institute (CHERI). Ronald Ehrenberg is the 
Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions and Economics at Cornell and the Director of 
CHERI. The authors are grateful to the Andrew W. 
Mellon Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies 
(USA) Inc. for supporting this research through their 
support of CHERI. 
The information on staff salaries and collective 
bargaining coverage used in this paper was provided 
conditional on the authors maintaining the confi-
dentiality both of the data and of the identities of 
institutions included in the sample. However, if 
other researchers are granted access to these data by 
the Association of Higher Education Facilities Offic-
ers, the authors will be happy to provide them with 
the other variables used in this analysis so that they 
can replicate the study. 
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Table 1. Collective Bargaining Coverage of College and University Staff in 1994. 
Occupation Total Estimated Employees Percent 
Category Employees in Bargaining Units Represented 
White-Collar 1,070,142 250,573 23.4 
Blue-Collar 306,335 131,232 42.8 
Total 1,376,477 381,805 27.7 
Sources: Digest of Education Statistics 1994 (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, 1994), 
pp . 228–29 (Total Employees); Directory of Staff Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education (New York: 
National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, 1995) 
(Employees in Bargaining Units). 
struggles represent a new battleground in 
American higher education. 
The growth of living wage movements on 
almost one hundred campuses stems, in 
part, from increasing awareness among staff 
at those institutions that their pay com-
pares poorly with that of similar staff at 
other institutions (Van Der Werf 2001). 
There are many potential explanations for 
these salary differences, including differ-
ences in local cost of living and in the 
resources that the academic institutions 
have available to pay faculty and staff sala-
ries. One other possible explanation is the 
influence of staff unions. Previous studies 
of the impact of unions on salaries in 
academia have focused on faculty unions 
and have concluded that these unions have 
achieved at best a small percentage gain in 
salary for their members relative to faculty 
salaries at academic institutions in which 
faculty are without union coverage.1 There 
have been no studies, however, of the im-
pact of collective bargaining on staff sala-
ries in higher education. 
Our paper addresses this issue. We first 
provide some background data on the num-
ber of blue-collar and white-collar employ-
ees covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments at American higher education insti-
tutions. We then use data from a 1997–98 
study on the costs of staffing in higher 
1See, for example, Ashraf (2000), Barbezat (1989), 
Kessering (1991), and Rees (1993). James Monks 
(2000) estimated union effects of 7–14%, which ex-
ceed the estimates found in other studies, but his 
sample consisted largely of two-year institutions. 
education conducted by the Association of 
Higher Education Facilities Officers (APPA) 
and other sources to estimate models that 
explain the variation in academic institu-
tions’ salaries for a number of narrowly 
defined blue-collar and white-collar occu-
pational groups that are employed by the 
academic institutions’ facilities divisions.2 
Of primary interest to us is the extent to 
which the salaries of academic staff covered 
by collective bargaining agreements exceed 
the salaries of otherwise comparable aca-
demic staff who are not covered by such 
agreements. 
Background Data 
Table 1 presents data on the employ-
ment levels of blue-collar and white-collar 
staff members employed in American 
higher education in the mid-1990s, as well 
as the percentage of each group that was 
covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment. A much higher percentage of blue-
collar employees (42.8%) than of white-
collar employees (23.4%) were represented 
by staff unions. Because there are many 
more white-collar employees, in the aggre-
gate about 27.7% of staff at American col-
leges and universities was covered by union 
contracts in the mid-1990s. 
The salary and collective bargaining cov-
erage data used in our study come from the 
APPA’s 1997–1998 Comparative Costs and 
2The acronym APPA is derived from the earlier 
name of the organization, the Association of Physical 
Plant Administrators of Universities and Colleges. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Academic Institutions 
by Carnegie Category and Control in the APPA Sample. 
Funding 
Carnegie Category Private Public Total 
Associate 
Baccalaureate 
Doctoral 
Masters 
Research 
Total 
1 (.01/.18) 
23 (.14/.19) 
4 (.02/.02) 
12 (.07/.09) 
7 (.04/.01) 
47 
13 (.08/.34) 
3 (.02/.03) 
16 (.10/.02) 
42 (.26/.10) 
42 (.26/.03) 
116 
14 
26 
20 
54 
49 
163 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are (share of institutions in the sample in the category)/(share of the nation’s 
2,873 higher education institutions in these categories that fall in the category). 
Staffing Report for College and University Facul-
ties.3 This data set provided information on 
salary levels and collective bargaining cov-
erage for 47 narrowly defined occupations 
at 193 U.S. and Canadian colleges, univer-
sities, and elementary and secondary 
schools. We restrict our attention to U.S. 
higher education institutions that were clas-
sified as Research, Doctoral, Masters, Bac-
calaureate, or Associate (two-year) institu-
tions by the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching (1994).4 The 
sample that we used ultimately consisted of 
163 institutions. 
Table 2 presents a breakdown of the 
institutions in our sample by Carnegie clas-
sification and by form of control. Public 
institutions constitute the majority of the 
institutions in each Carnegie category in 
our sample, except for the Baccalaureate 
category. As the table indicates, our sample 
3We are grateful to Joseph Lally, Director of Busi-
ness Operations for Cornell’s Facilities Services Divi-
sion, for granting us access to these data, under the 
condition that we keep the data confidential and not 
identify the specific institutions that participated in 
the survey. 
4In addition to excluding Canadian and elemen-
tary and secondary institutions, we also excluded 
specialized U.S. institutions such as seminaries and 
conservatories. Institutions in the Research and Doc-
toral categories have annual research volumes and 
annual numbers of doctoral degrees granted that 
exceed specified minimum levels ( the levels are higher 
for the Research category). 
is not representative of American higher 
education as a whole. In particular, two-
year institutions and private baccalaureate 
institutions are under-represented in our 
sample, while public masters and doctoral 
and all research universities are over-repre-
sented. 
We restrict our attention to the 22 occu-
pations in the survey that are not manage-
rial or executive, and we include only those 
sample observations for which both an oc-
cupational salary level and whether the 
employees in the occupation were covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement are 
reported. Table 3 shows the difference in 
mean annual salaries between unionized 
and non-unionized employees for each oc-
cupation, the ratio of the mean salary in an 
occupation for employees who were cov-
ered by union contracts to the mean salary 
in an occupation for employees who were 
not covered by a union contract, and the 
difference in mean salaries between cov-
ered and noncovered institutions, as well as 
the standard deviation of the difference in 
the means. 
In each occupation, employees covered 
by a union contract earned considerably 
more than employees not covered by a 
contract, with the raw differentials in the 
mean salaries varying across occupations 
from 17% to 42%. In each occupation the 
difference in mean salaries between cov-
ered and noncovered employees is more 
than twice the standard error of the differ-
ence in the means, allowing us to reject the 
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Table 3. Mean Occupational Salaries in 1997–98 for Employees Covered by Collective 
Bargaining Agreements and Not Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements in the APPA Sample. 
Occupation (n) 
SECRETARY (143) 
CUSTODIAN (142) 
GROUNDSKEEPER (150) 
CARPENTER (143) 
ELECTRICIAN (145) 
LOCKSMITH (119) 
AC/REFRIG (120) 
PAINTER (131) 
PLUMBER (139) 
PROGRAMMER (82) 
HVACTECH (104) 
UTILITIESOP (105) 
GENERALMAINT (110) 
ELEVMECHANIC (30) 
VEHMECHANIC (108) 
STOREKEEPER (102) 
GENERALLABOR (84) 
SECURITY (57) 
MACHINIST (71) 
MASON (63) 
ROOFER (57) 
SHEETMTLWRKR (51) 
(1) 
Mean Salary 
Noncovered 
$21,953 
16,993 
18,838 
26,206 
27,701 
27,243 
26,576 
24,468 
26,852 
37,311 
30,866 
24,758 
24,121 
31,633 
25,914 
23,750 
19,097 
26,849 
29,065 
27,392 
26,354 
28,286 
(2) 
Mean Salary 
Covered 
$26,987 
22,850 
26,138 
35,962 
38,629 
33,463 
37,600 
34,645 
37,575 
43,509 
37,357 
36,307 
31,746 
44,053 
32,424 
28,689 
27,071 
35,665 
36,249 
35,717 
35,623 
36,530 
(3) 
Difference in 
Means (Se)a 
$5,025 (225) 
5,857 (105) 
7,300 (108) 
9,756 (144) 
10,928 (162) 
6,220 (765) 
11,024 (177) 
10,177 (149) 
10,723 (173) 
6,198 (683) 
6,491 (245) 
11,549 (209) 
7,625 (200) 
12,420 (690) 
6,581 (157) 
4,939 (164) 
7,975 (189) 
8,816 (770) 
7,184 (256) 
8,325 (284) 
9,270 (325) 
8,244 (391) 
(4) 
Ratio of 
the Means 
(2)/(1) 
1.23 
1.34 
1.39 
1.37 
1.39 
1.23 
1.41 
1.42 
1.40 
1.17 
1.21 
1.47 
1.32 
1.39 
1.25 
1.21 
1.42 
1.33 
1.25 
1.30 
1.35 
1.29 
aStandard error of the absolute difference in the means. 
Source: Authors’ computations from the APPA data. Only institutions that reported both a salary figure for 
an occupation and whether it was covered by a union contract are included. All of the differences of the means 
are statistically significantly different from zero at the .05 level of significance. 
hypothesis that covered and noncovered 
workers’ salaries are equal. The differ-
ences are largest in the skilled trades. Sala-
ries for custodial workers, the group of 
employees that has been the focus of the 
living wage debate on many campuses, were 
the lowest in the group, and the unionized 
custodial workers in the sample earned 
about 34% more on average than custodial 
workers at academic institutions that were 
not covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 
Estimating the Union/ 
Nonunion Salary Advantage 
of Unionized Academic Staff 
The estimated differences in the salaries 
of academic staff covered by and not cov-
ered by union contracts reported in Table 
3 are raw differences that do not control for 
characteristics of the institutions, or of the 
areas in which the institutions are located, 
that might be expected to influence staff 
salaries independent of unionization. For 
example, if academic institutions whose 
employees were organized also had greater 
financial resources, or were located in 
higher cost-of-living areas, than institutions 
whose employees were not organized, one 
would expect to observe the former paying 
higher salaries than the latter even if union-
ization per se had no effect on the salaries 
of staff at academic institutions. To esti-
mate whether staff unions influence sala-
ries, it is necessary to control for the other 
characteristics of the institutions that might 
be expected to influence salaries. 
To accomplish this, we initially pool the 
data across occupations and institutions 
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and estimate staff salary equations of the 
form 
(1) Log (Wij) = a0 + a1Uij + a2Yj 
+ a3Zj + a4Fj + a5di + eij . 
In equation (1) , Wij is the annual salary 
paid to a staff member in occupation i at 
academic institution j , Uij is a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the employees 
in occupation i are unionized in institution 
j , Yj is a vector of dichotomous variables 
indicating the Carnegie classification of 
institution j (two-year colleges are the omit-
ted category), Zj is a vector of other vari-
ables that vary across institutions and are 
expected to influence staff salaries, Fj is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether 
the faculty at academic institution j are 
unionized, di is a vector of occupational 
dichotomous variables, and the ei are ran-
dom error terms. Because the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of salaries, a1 can 
be interpreted as the estimated percentage 
by which the salaries of staff in institutions 
with collective bargaining for the occupa-
tion exceed the salaries of staff at institu-
tions without collective bargaining for the 
occupation, after controlling for the other 
factors expected to influence salaries.5 
We include in the Zj a set of variables that 
influence the resources academic institu-
tions have at their command out of which 
to pay the salaries of staff. These include 
the logarithm of the institution’s endow-
ment per student (LENDOWM/STDNT), the 
logarithm of its average undergraduate tu-
ition (LTUITION), and, for public institu-
tions, the logarithm of its state and local 
government appropriations per student 
(LGOVAPPROPS/STDNT).6 Also included in 
this vector, to control for differences in 
cost of living or wage levels across areas, is 
the logarithm of the mean salary of custodi-
5More precisely, the estimated un ion /nonun ion 
salary differential is given by (ea1 – 1)(100). 
6For public institutions, this is a weighted average 
of in-state and out-of-state tuitions, with the weights 
depending on the fraction of the institution’s stu-
dents who come from each category. 
ans in the city in which the academic insti-
tution is located ( LMEAN CUSTOD SAL ) . When 
an institution was not located in a city for 
which we had mean custodian salary data, 
the mean custodian wage in the state was 
substituted. The occupational dichotomous 
(di) variables are included to control for 
differences in salaries across occupations, 
and the faculty union variable (Fj) is in-
cluded to see if salary gains won by faculty 
unions spill over to staff unions’ compensa-
tion. Finally, included in this vector is the 
logarithm of the average math and verbal 
S A T 75 th percentile score for entering fresh-
men at the institution ( L S A T ) . This vari-
able, as well as the Carnegie category vari-
ables, were included to see if the “selectiv-
ity” of an academic institution, or its institu-
tional type, influences the salary of its staff, 
once we have controlled for its financial 
resources. 
The first column of Table 4 presents the 
estimates of equation (1) . Staff members 
covered by a collective bargaining contract 
in our sample are paid about 9% more than 
staff members who are not covered by a 
contract, other factors held constant, and 
staff members appear to earn close to an-
other 3 % more if the faculty at the institu-
tion are also covered by a union contract. 
Staff members’ salaries are clearly strongly 
related to the proxy for the cost of living or 
alternative wages in the area (LMEAN 
CUSTODSAL), and we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that a 1% increase in the average 
wage of custodians in the area is associated 
with a 1% increase in academic institu-
tions’ staff members’ salaries.7 
We find little evidence that institutions 
that are better off financially, as measured 
by endowment per student, average tuition 
level, or, for public institutions, per stu-
dent state and local government appro-
7Substitution of a census housing price index in an 
area for the average custodian wage measure led to 
poorer fits and less statistically significant coefficients. 
It thus appears that the average custodian wage re-
flects area wage level differences more than it reflects 
cost of living differences. 
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Table 4. Logarithm of 1997–98 Salary Equations: Pooled Regressions.a 
(Absolute Value of t Statistics in Parentheses) 
BACHELORS 
DOCTORAL 
MASTERS 
RESEARCH 
L G O V A P P R O P S / S T D N T 
L E N D O W M / S T D N T 
LTUITION 
LSAT 
LMEANCUSTODSAL 
UNIONCONTRACT 
FACUNIONIZED 
UCUSTODIAN 
USECRETARY 
UGROUNDSKEEPER 
UCARPENTER 
UELECTRICIAN 
ULOCKSMITH 
UAC/REFRIG 
UPAINTER 
UPLUMBER 
UPROGRAMMER 
UHVACTECH 
UUTILITIESOP 
UGENERALMAINT 
UELEVMECHANIC 
UVEHMECHANIC 
USTOREKEEPER 
UGENERALLABOR 
USECURITY 
UMACHINIST 
UMASON 
UROOFER 
USHEETMTLWRKR 
R2/n 
-.147 
-.118 
-.098 
-.077 
-.025 
.000 
-.024 
.359 
.997 
.093 
.028 
(1) 
(5.5) 
(4.5) 
(4.5) 
(3.2) 
(6.2) 
(0.0) 
(3.3) 
(5.0) 
(22.7) 
(7.9) 
(2.2) 
.602/2115 
(2) 
-.146 
-.120 
-.100 
-.078 
-.024 
.000 
-.023 
.349 
.991 
.028 
.116 
.024 
.044 
.124 
.131 
.046 
.150 
.161 
.136 
.011 
.034 
.156 
.118 
.129 
.042 
.026 
.152 
.068 
.044 
.086 
.088 
.063 
(3.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.6) 
(3.2) 
(6.0) 
(0.0) 
(3.3) 
(4.8) 
(22.6) 
(2.3) 
(3.5) 
(0.7) 
(1.2) 
(3.7) 
(4.0) 
(1.2) 
(4.2) 
(4.6) 
(3.9) 
(0.2) 
(0.8) 
(3.8) 
(2.9) 
(1.7) 
(1.1) 
(0.6) 
(3.4) 
(1.0) 
(0.9) 
(0.7) 
(1.6) 
(1.0) 
.604/2115 
(3) 
-.136 
-.146 
-.117 
-.082 
-.021 
-.003 
-.018 
.320 
1.000 
.108 
.022 
(7.0) 
(4.5) 
(4.4) 
(2.8) 
(4.2) 
(0.9) 
(2.0) 
(3.5) 
(17.7) 
(7.0) 
(1.4) 
.638/1207 
(4) 
-.133 
-.146 
-.117 
-.083 
-.021 
-.003 
-.018 
.303 
.994 
.024 
.120 
.023 
.048 
.127 
.135 
.047 
.154 
.163 
.139 
(4.2) 
(4.6) 
(4.4) 
(2.7) 
(4.2) 
(0.9) 
(2.0) 
(3.3) 
(17.6) 
(1.5) 
(3.7) 
(0.6) 
(1.4) 
(3.8) 
(4.1) 
(1.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.8) 
(4.1) 
.641/1207 
aAlso included in the model were intercept terms for each occupation (one was excluded to avoid perfect 
collinearity) and dichotomous variables for non-reporting of endowment per student, government appropria-
tions per student, tuition, and average S A T scores. 
Variable explanations. B ACHELORS = 1 if the Carnegie Category of the institution was Baccalaureate, 0 otherwise; 
DOCTORAL = 1 if the Carnegie Category of the institution was Doctoral, 0 otherwise; MASTERS = 1 if the Carnegie 
Category of the institution was Masters, 0 otherwise; RESEARCH = 1 if the Carnegie Category of the institution was 
Research, 0 otherwise ( the omitted category is 2-year college institution). LAPPROPS/STDNT = interaction between 
a (0 , 1) dichotomous variable for being a public institution and the logarithm of state and local government 
appropriations per student; LENDOWMENT/STDNT = logarithm of endowment per student at the institution; 
LTUITION = logarithm of the average undergraduate tuition at the institution; LSAT = logarithm of the average 
75 th percentile scores on entering students’ verbal and mathematics S A T scores; LMEANCUSTODSAL = logarithm 
of the mean salary for custodians in the city or state of the institution; UNIONCONTRACT = 1 if the occupation was 
covered by a union contract at the institution, 0 otherwise; FACUNIONIZED = 1 if the institution’s faculty members 
were covered by a union contract, 0 otherwise. UCAT: subsequent variables with the prefix U are equal to 1 if 
the indicated occupation was covered by a union contract at the institution, 0 otherwise (models in which union 
impact varies by occupation). See the Appendix for the list of occupation categories. 
Data Sources. BACHELORS, DOCTORAL, MASTERS, RESEARCH, PUBLIC/PRIVATE, UNIONCONTRACT, and UCAT: A P P A 
Survey. LAPPROPS/STDNT, LENDOWMENT/STDNT, LTUITION: Webcaspar. L S A T : America’s Best Colleges—1998 
(Washington, D . C . : U.S. News & World Report, 1997). LMEANCUSTODSAL: Metropolitan Area Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates ( U . S Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000; http://www.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm). 
FACUNIONIZED: Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education, 
National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions (Baruch 
College, New York, 1997). 
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priation level, pay staff members higher 
salaries. Indeed, institutions with higher 
tuition levels and public institutions with 
higher state appropriations per student 
actually appear to pay their staff lower sala-
ries, other factors held constant. That insti-
tutional financial variables do not influ-
ence staff salary levels is not completely 
surprising. Academic institutions draw 
employees in the occupations included in 
our sample primarily from local labor mar-
kets, and while institutions may talk about 
wanting to attract employees of the highest 
possible quality, they are less concerned 
about doing so for support staff than they 
are for faculty, upon whom presumably an 
institution’s reputation is strongly based.8 
We do find, however, that the selectivity 
of an institution’s undergraduate students, 
as measured by their SAT scores, is posi-
tively related to the salaries of staff in these 
occupations. An explanation for this find-
ing is that to attract high-quality students, 
institutions find they need to provide both 
academic and nonacademic services of high 
quality, and thus they offer higher staff 
salaries to attract, motivate, and retain 
higher-quality staff.9 
8Indeed, when we estimated a similar equation to 
explain the logarithm of average full professors’ sala-
ries, we found that the logarithm of endowment per 
student was positively related to this salary measure, 
indicating that richer universities do attempt to at-
tract higher-quality faculty. Neither the presence of 
a faculty union nor the share of staff occupations that 
were covered by collective bargaining agreement was 
significantly associated with the average faculty sala-
ries. Finally, in contrast to the results for the staff 
salary equations, use of the housing price index rather 
than the custodian wage marginally improved the 
performance of the faculty salary equation. This 
lends credence to the assertion that universities hire 
faculty in a national market and thus variables that 
reflect area cost of living will influence their salaries. 
9At first glance, one might be tempted to conclude 
also that, other factors held constant, staff members 
at 2-year institutions ( the omitted Carnegie category) 
earn between 8% and 15% more than their counter-
parts employed at baccalaureate, masters, doctoral, 
and research institutions. However, as a referee has 
pointed out to us, this comparison would not be very 
useful, because other factors are not constant across 
Carnegie categories. For example, SAT scores are not 
reported for 2-year institutions, and hence our SAT 
The estimates above assume that the 
impact of staff unions on staff salaries is the 
same across all occupations. In column (2) 
we report the results of estimating a model 
in which the impact of staff unions is al-
lowed to vary across occupations. The esti-
mated collective bargaining coverage dif-
ferentials vary from about 1% to 16%, but 
the differential is statistically significantly 
different from zero in only 10 of the 22 
occupations. The differentials appear to 
be largest in many of the skilled trades, 
where unions historically have achieved 
substantial wage gains for their members. 
Given the relatively small number of obser-
vations for a number of the occupations, it 
is difficult to distinguish between the hy-
pothesis that collective bargaining cover-
age has no effect on university staff mem-
bers’ salaries in these occupations and the 
hypothesis that larger sample sizes might 
yield a statistically significant effect.10 
To get around the small sample size prob-
lem and to lay the foundation for the sensi-
tivity analyses that we conduct in the next 
section, we restrict our attention to the 
nine occupations for which we have the 
greatest numbers of observations; in col-
umn (3) we provide the estimated coeffi-
cients when equation (1) is estimated using 
this restricted sample of data. The esti-
mated collective bargaining coverage dif-
ferential is around 1 1 % , which is very close 
variable is coded zero and the dichotomous variable 
that is inc luded in t he mode l to cont ro l for 
nonreporting of SAT scores is coded one for each 2-
year college. When the mean values, by Carnegie 
category, are substituted for each of the variables in 
the model, including those not reported in the table 
(except for staff unionization, which we set equal to 
zero), the model predicts that in the absence of staff 
unions, average staff salaries are actually lowest at the 
2-year institutions. 
10For example, only 30 institutions provide data 
for elevator maintenance workers (Table 3) , and 
larger sample sizes might indicate that the estimated 
union differential for this occupation of about 13 
percentage points was statistically significant. A for-
mal F test allows us, however, to reject at the .05 level 
of significance the hypothesis that the impact of staff 
unions on staff salaries is the same across all occupa-
tions. 
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to that found in the unrestricted sample. 
In column (4) we present estimates for the 
restricted data sample that allow the effects 
of union coverage to vary across occupa-
tions. The estimated differentials are virtu-
ally identical to those found in column (2) . 
We find statistically significant union cov-
erage differentials in the range of 12–16% 
for the skilled building trades crafts—car-
penters, electricians, painters, and plumb-
ers—and statistically insignificant differen-
tials that are close to zero for administra-
tive secretaries, groundskeepers, and lock-
smiths. In addition, custodians covered by 
union contracts earn about 12% more than 
custodians not covered by contracts, all 
other variables held constant. 
Several extensions warrant brief men-
tion here. We also estimated, for both of 
the samples used in Table 4, models that 
allowed the estimated collective bargain-
ing coverage differentials to vary with the 
Carnegie category of an academic institu-
tion and whether the institution was public 
or private. The estimated differentials were 
virtually identical for public and private 
academic institutions. However, they did 
vary across Carnegie category. In particu-
lar, by far the largest estimated differential, 
varying from about 20% to 30% depending 
on the sample, was observed for the two-
year colleges. This finding is consistent 
with James Monks’s (2000) finding, cited 
earlier, that faculty unions’ “impacts” on 
salaries, although smaller in magnitude 
than staff unions’, are largest at the two-
year institutions. 
Testing for the Sensitivity of Our 
Findings to Alternative Specifications 
Our primary concern is the effect of 
unionization on staff employees’ salaries. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of addi-
tional econometric modeling we conducted 
to investigate the sensitivity of the estimated 
union coefficient to the variables included 
in the analyses and to the econometric 
methods used. To provide a baseline, col-
umn (1) reports again the estimated union 
coefficients that are reported in column 
(4) of Table 4. 
The estimates in Table 4 come from a 
model in which all of the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, save for the inter-
cept term and collective bargaining cover-
age in the occupation, are assumed to be 
constant across occupations. A more gen-
eral specification would allow the coeffi-
cients of all variables to vary across occupa-
tions by estimating separate equations for 
each occupation. The collective bargain-
ing coverage coefficients we obtained when 
we did this are shown in column (2) of 
Table 5. In the main, these are very similar 
to the corresponding coefficients found in 
column (1) , never varying by more than 
.02. 
The estimates presented in columns (1) 
and (2) treat each occupational equation 
as independent. They ignore the fact that 
there may be some omitted institution-level 
variables that influence the salaries of staff 
in all occupations. For example, the un ion / 
nonunion wage advantage for an occupa-
tion at an institution may depend on the 
fraction of the other staff occupations at 
an institution that are covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements . Hence the 
wages of any given staff occupation at an 
academic institution may depend on the 
unionization of all staff occupations at 
the institution. 
We attempted to re-estimate the models 
underlying column (2) , including as an 
additional explanatory variable the frac-
tion of all nine occupations that were cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements.11 
Unfortunately, when one of the nine occu-
pations was covered by a contract, the vast 
majority of the other occupations also were 
covered by a contract. Hence the coverage 
by union contract variable for an occupa-
tion was very highly correlated with the 
fraction of the nine occupations at the 
institution that were covered by union con-
tracts. The high degree of collinearity pre-
vented us from estimating such a model. 
11Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) followed a simi-
lar procedure in their study of the impact of public 
sector unions on the wages of different occupational 
categories of public employees. 
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Table 5. Logarithm of 1997–98 Occupational Salary 
Equations: Coefficients of Union Variables—Sensitivity Analyses. 
(Absolute Value of t Statistics in Parentheses) 
Occupation (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Administrative Secretary 
Custodian 
Groundskeeper 
Carpenter 
Electrician 
Locksmith 
Air Conditioning and 
Refrigeration 
Painter 
Plumber 
.023 (0.6) 
.120 (3.7) 
.048 (1.4) 
.127 (3.8) 
.135 (4.1) 
.047 (1.3) 
.154 (4.4) 
.163 (4.8) 
.139 (4.1) 
.031 (0.6) 
.130 (3.4) 
.014 (0.2) 
.120 (2.6) 
.113 (2.3) 
.058 (1.3) 
.168 (3.2) 
.143 (3.0) 
.133 (2.7) 
.010 (0.2) 
.067 (2.0) 
.027 (0.4) 
.107 (1.6) 
.123 (1.8) 
.047 (0.9) 
.115 (1.8) 
.122 (2.0) 
.157 (2.4) 
.004 (0.1) 
.092 (2.1) 
-.046 (0.9) 
.102 (2.0) 
.110 (2.1) 
.033 (0.7) 
.142 (2.5) 
.131 (2.5) 
.115 (2.1) 
Column explanations: 
(1) Union coefficients from Table 4, column (4) ; 
(2) Union coefficients from separate occupational salary equations; 
(3) Union coefficients from separate occupational salary equations—seemingly unrelated regressions for 
the sample of institutions that reported data for all nine occupations; 
(4) Selectivity bias corrected estimates corresponding to the estimates in column (2 ) . 
A second way to get at this issue is simply 
to treat the nine occupational salary equa-
tions as a single system and to allow the 
error terms to be correlated across equa-
tions. Estimating this system using the 
method of seemingly unrelated regressions 
will increase the efficiency of our estimates; 
however, as long as none of the other statis-
tical assumptions is violated, the estimates 
reported in column (2) will remain unbi-
ased.12 
The method of seemingly unrelated re-
gressions will increase the efficiency of the 
estimated coefficients only if the identical 
explanatory variables do not appear in each 
equation. In our system, the only explana-
tory variable that varies across occupations 
is whether employees in an occupation are 
covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment at an institution. We have already 
indicated that the fraction of occupations 
organized at an institution is highly corre-
12The seemingly unrelated regression model was 
developed by Zellner (1962). 
lated with whether any one of the occupa-
tions is organized across institutions. Given 
this fact, it is not surprising that the esti-
mated union coefficients we obtained when 
we re-estimated the model by seemingly 
unrelated regressions (column 3) were very 
similar to the coefficients found in column 
(2) of the table. Any differences are prob-
ably due to sampling error, since the seem-
ingly unrelated regression model could only 
be estimated using data on the subset of 
institutions that reported occupational sal-
ary and unionization data for all nine occu-
pations. 
Finally, our estimates of the salary advan-
tage that staff members working in union-
ized academic environments have over staff 
members working in nonunion academic 
environments treat staff coverage by a col-
lective bargaining agreement as being ex-
ogenous. If, for example, the institutions 
in which we observe staff covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement were initially 
the institutions in which staff compensa-
tion was lowest, other factors held con-
stant, our estimates will understate the ex-
tent to which academic staff unions have 
improved their members’ compensation 
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relative to the compensation of academic 
staff at institutions not covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 
In the absence of a panel data set that 
would permit us to estimate how changes in 
staff salaries at academic institutions are 
related to changes in collective bargaining 
coverage, we use the sample selection bias 
correction method first developed by James 
Heckman (1979) and Lung Fei Lee (1978).13 
Collective bargaining coverage for an occu-
pation at an institution is assumed to be a 
function of the percentage wage gain that 
workers in the occupation might be ex-
pected to receive if they voted for union 
coverage, as well as variables that likely 
influence the workers’ “tastes” for collec-
tive bargaining coverage. 
Academic staff members’ tastes for col-
lective bargaining are assumed to be re-
lated to the proportions of private and 
public employees in the institution’s state 
covered by collected bargaining agree-
ments, each interacted with a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the institution 
was public or private. This specification 
allows the impact of the magnitude of col-
lective bargaining coverage for private and 
public employees in the state to differen-
tially influence the probability of union 
coverage for a staff occupation at an aca-
demic institution, depending on whether 
the academic institution is public or pri-
vate. 
The expected percentage wage gain is 
assumed to depend on all of the variables 
that enter the occupational wage equation. 
This specification allows the impact on staff 
salaries of each explanatory variable found 
in equation (1) to differ for workers cov-
ered by and not covered by collective bar-
13A similar survey was undertaken by the APPA in 
1999–2000. However, the number of institutions 
present in both survey years is considerably smaller 
than the sample size used in this study, and the 
number of institutions that were in the survey in both 
years and actually saw a change in union coverage for 
a staff occupation during the period was close to zero. 
Hence, the longitudinal data cannot be used to pro-
vide estimates of the relationships that are of interest 
to us. 
gaining agreements.14 
A two-stage approach is then followed. 
In the first stage we estimate a probit re-
duced form probability of union coverage 
equation for workers in each occupation, 
which is specified to be a function of all of 
the variables found in equation (1) , along 
with the statewide proportions of employ-
ees who are union members in the public 
and private sectors, interacted with whether 
the academic institution is public or pri-
vate.15 The estimates of this equation allow 
us to compute an estimate of the inverse 
mills ratio for each observation; this is added 
as an additional explanatory variable, and 
equation (1) is then re-estimated. Inclu-
sion of this estimated inverse mills ratio in 
the model controls for the nonrandom 
nature of union coverage.16 
The estimated union coefficients that we 
obtained when the sample selection bias 
correction method was used are shown in 
column (4) of Table 5. In most cases these 
estimates prove to be very similar to the 
OLS estimates reported in column (2) . The 
estimated union coefficients for custodi-
ans, carpenters, electricians, heating and 
cooling technicians, painters, and plumb-
14We have allowed our estimated collective bar-
gaining coverage effects to vary with some of the 
variables that enter the salary equations and found, 
for example, that in most cases collective bargaining 
coverage effects were not larger in the public sector 
than in the private sector and that, within the private 
sector, higher endowment levels per student were not 
associated with higher collective bargaining effects. 
However, in a few occupations they were larger for 
staff employed in two-year colleges than for staff 
employed in other academic institutions. 
15A table with the estimated coefficients of the 
union coverage equation for each occupation is avail-
able from the authors upon request. The major 
interesting finding from these probits is that for 
several occupations, the proportion of public sector 
employees who are organized statewide does have a 
positive effect on the probability of observing the 
occupation at a public academic institution covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement. 
16The coefficients of the estimated inverse mills 
ratios were negative in all nine occupational staff 
salary equations but were statistically significantly 
different from zero at the .05 (.10) level of signifi-
cance in only one ( three) cases. 
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ers remain statistically significant, and each 
coefficient is close to its value in the OLS 
equations. In five of the six occupations 
the selectivity corrected coefficients are 1– 
3 percentage points smaller. The estimated 
u n i o n coeff icients for sec re ta r i e s , 
groundskeepers, and locksmiths are statis-
tically insignificantly different from zero, 
as they were in the OLS estimation. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study is, to our knowledge, the first 
published effort to estimate the effect of 
collective bargaining coverage on the sala-
ries of staff members at American higher 
education institutions. When we treated 
collective bargaining coverage as exog-
enous, we obtained an estimated u n i o n / 
nonunion salary differential in the range of 
9–11% for the occupations in our sample. 
The magnitude of the differential appears 
to be larger in 2-year institutions than in 4-
year institutions, but does not vary between 
the public and private sectors. When fac-
ulty members are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, staff members in 
these institutions appear to gain an addi-
tional increment in salary of about 2 to 3 
percentage points. Thus, it appears that 
there are spillovers from faculty unions to 
staff unions. 
The impact of collective bargaining cov-
erage on staff salaries varies widely across 
the occupations in our sample. While some 
unions, in particular many of those in the 
skilled building trades, appear to have won 
wage gains for their members in the 13–16-
percentage-point range, other staff unions 
appear to have won much smaller wage 
advantages or none at all for their mem-
bers. Generalizing our approach to allow 
for separate estimating equations by occu-
pation, to allow for interdependencies of 
the error terms across equations, and to 
allow for staff units covered by collective 
bargaining agreements to be a nonrandom 
sample of all staff unions does not substan-
tially alter our findings, although the last of 
those three modified specifications yields 
somewhat smaller estimated effects in sev-
eral occupations. 
The limitations of our study should be 
kept in mind. First, the sample of 163 
academic institutions used in our study is 
not fully representative of the population 
of over 3,000 two- and four-year colleges 
and universities in the United States. The 
22 occupations whose salaries we analyze 
all relate to employees from the facilities 
division of America’s colleges and universi-
ties, and the effects we estimate for them 
are not necessarily representative of the 
effects for staff unions that one might ob-
serve for a wider range of college and uni-
versity staff employed in other areas (for 
example, housing and dining, athletics, 
academic support, student services, and 
external relations). 
Second, the data to which we have access 
contain no information on employee char-
acteristics, such as education and experi-
ence. Thus they do not permit us to test the 
hypothesis that the higher salaries of staff 
members found at academic institutions 
with staff unions are offset by compensat-
ing staff members’ productivity gains. These 
gains may occur because the higher salaries 
permit the institutions to hire better-qual-
ity employees, reduce staff turnover, and 
increase staff job tenure, or because collec-
tive bargaining coverage directly leads to 
improved staff morale and productivity.17 
Third, we have no information on the ex-
tent to which staff union contracts restrict 
the ability of academic institutions to con-
tract out work and thus the extent to which 
academic institutions respond to salary 
gains won by staff unions by contracting out 
more work to external subcontractors. 
Hence we cannot conclude from our find-
ings that the academic institutions are worse 
off (in a cost sense) from having staff unions. 
Nonetheless, our study suggests that col-
lective bargaining coverage does influence 
staff salaries in higher education. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act governs collective 
17Numerous studies have tested the Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) exit-voice hypothesis and found that 
private sector unions tend to reduce employees’ turn-
over rates. Daniel Rees (1994) found that faculty 
unions in the United States reduce turnover rates of 
associate and assistant professors. 
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bargaining for staff of private academic 
institutions, while state public employee 
bargaining laws govern collective bargain-
ing for staff at public academic institutions. 
Our findings suggest that a direct way to 
achieve better salaries for college and uni-
versity employees employed in many staff 
occupations is to encourage them to orga-
nize and bargain collectively. Unlike pri-
vate college and university faculty mem-
bers, who are effectively precluded from 
collective bargaining at many institutions 
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the Yeshiva case, there is no such prohibi-
tion to prevent staff at these institutions 
from organizing.18 
18See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 944 U.S. 672 
(1980). 
We also find that when other factors 
are held constant, including the proxy 
for area wage levels and collective bar-
gaining coverage, there is no evidence 
that more financially well-off academic 
institutions pay their staff higher sala-
ries. Whether public pressure should be 
brought to bear on a wider range of aca-
demic institutions that have the financial 
resources to improve their staff mem-
bers’ salaries if they choose is an open 
question. We say “should be” rather than 
“can be” because the welfare implica-
tions of higher salaries for staff at higher 
education institutions are not obvious: 
higher staff salaries will, after all, mean 
higher costs and, ultimately, higher tu-
ition levels, unless these increased costs 
can be offset by productivity gains. 
Appendix 
Occupational Descriptions 
Occupation Description Occupation Description 
SECRETARY Secretarial/Clerical 
CUSTODIAN Custodial/Housekeeper 
GROUNDSKEEPER Groundskeeper 
CARPENTER Carpenter 
ELECTRICIAN Electrician 
LOCKSMITH Locksmith 
AC/REFRIG Air Conditioning and Refrigeration 
PAINTER Painter 
PLUMBER Plumber/Pipefitter 
PROGRAMMER Computer Program/Analyst 
HVACTECH HVAC/Controls Technician 
UTILITIESOP Utilities Operator/Maintenance 
GENERALMAINT General Zone Maintenance Worker 
ELEVMECHANIC Elevator Mechanic 
VEHMECHANIC Vehicle/Equipment Mechanic 
STOREKEEPER Storekeeper/Expediter 
GENERALLABOR General Labor Worker 
SECURITY Security Worker 
MACHINIST Machinist/Welder 
MASON Mason 
ROOFER Roofing Worker 
SHEETMTLWRKR Sheet Metal Worker 
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